



Practical experience with and countermeasures for GNSS jamming and spoofing


Gustavo Lopez

18 December 2019




1983


History of computer viruses



People do know about computer viruses



What about GPS jamming/spoofing?



Who is Septentrio?

APPLICATION KNOW HOW

- Machine control & guidance
- Reference stations
- Scientific applications
- Survey, Mapping and GIS
- UAS & Robotics




RELIABLE & ACCURATE POSITIONING

- Reliable positioning
- Advanced anti-jamming & anti-spoofing technology
- Robust and secure FW




YOUR OEM PARTNER


- Our mission is to make our customers successful



Modules



Boards



Housed receivers



Smart antenna




Scientific Receivers

GNSS used more & more in critical applications



Sensitivity by market

Different users & needs => all being pushed higher in reliability



Do people know about jamming?

Or spoofing?

1. What is GPS spoofing?

- ☐ A GPS signal destroyed
- ☐ A signal pretending to be a GPS signal
- ☐ A computer virus affecting my GPS
- ☐ A weak signal which does not allow me to know my GPS location
- ☐ Do not know

SPOOFING?



2. Do you know what is GPS jamming?

- ☐ Same as GPS spoofing but another name
- ☐ A GPS signal destroyed
- ☐ A weak signal which does not allow me to know my GPS location
- ☐ Another GPS system virus
- ☐ Do not know

JAMMING?

- Same as GPS spoofing but an...
- A GPS signal destroyed
- A weak signal which does not ...
- Another GPS system virus
- Do not know



3. If GPS fails what is going to be affected

- ☐ My mobile phone
- ☐ My car
- ☐ My home electricity
- ☐ My bank
- ☐ none

RISK?


- My mobile phone
- My car
- My home electricity
- My bank
- none



6. Who could be more likely to hack your GPS position?

- ☐ Car robber or kidnapper
- ☐ My Government
- ☐ China
- ☐ Russia
- ☐ Truck driver in the highway
- ☐ My husband or wife
- ☐ My parents

WHO IS THE ATTACKER?



Failed 😞

People do not really know about Spoofing or Jamming

Computer Security



Bob Thomas


Jamming/Spoofing




Todd Humphreys



Maker Vlog



Crazy Danish Hacker



ali aghaei saem 4 months ago

How could you spoof smart phone's GPS? I use Pluto SDR and simply I can spoof ublox neo-6m but although using only GPS mode, even I can not see satellites on GPS test!

REPLY

Hide replies



Crazy Danish Hacker 4 months ago

You may need to spoof multiple satellite constellations. You should also check the signal you're transmitting is actually working with a separate receiver.

REPLY



Andeti 2 years ago

What challenges and security issues do GPS communication face as at the moment. Any advances to solve the solution? Albert, Kenya.

REPLY

Hide replies




Crazy Danish Hacker 2 years ago

Public GPS has always been prone to spoofing, and given the relatively low cost of a software defined radio (SDR) such as HackRF and BladeRF, it is now widely possible for people to perform GPS spoofing on a global scale.



Crazy Danish Hacker (spoofer)



Tunakann 2 months ago

So all you need is the Arduino? The transmitter and power just affect the strength and range?

3 REPLY


Hide replies



Maker Vlog 2 months ago

Pretty much

3 REPLY



Love Revolution 2 weeks ago

Anyone know where they're not illegal, lol. How could they know if you're using it? I want to build one for my home that neutralizes all frequencies, including satellite, for mind body protection. Are the frequencies transmitted by the jammer equally malignant or Benin? Could natural sound waves, ocean etc be used? ♥



Tabish khan 1 month ago

how about GPS signal. Is it easy to design a jamming devise for GPS signal.

REPLY

Hide replies




Maker Vlog 1 month ago

All you need is a device that can transmit on those frequencys

REPLY




Maker Vlog (jammer)



How to Make A Mobile Multi Frequency Jammer

Interference (Jamming)

Examples



Common cases of interference

Radio amateurs



Figure 2: construction site at Ostend harbour




Figure 3: spectrum plot of the L2 band showing interference from an amateur television transmission



Navigation beacons




Figure 4: spectrum plot of the L2 band showing the signal from a navigation beacon in relation to the GPS and GLONASS L2 signals



Intentional Jammers




Figure 7: typical in-car chirp jammers (PPDs (Personal Privacy Devices))

<http://Jammers.Store>

Other communications (Immarsat/Iridium/LTE)




Figure 6: spectrum plot of the L1 band showing the location of Immarsat/Iridium/LTE transmissions are located at higher frequencies



Self-interference




Figure 5: interference from a GoPro Hero 2 video camera picked up by a GNSS antenna

Set-Up - Interference Lane detection






Figure 7: typical in-car chirp jammers (PPDs (Personal Privacy Devices))

Overview

- 45 Events of Heavy Interference in 4,8 Days
- 3 Classes





Figure 7: typical in-car chirp jammers (PPDs (Personal Privacy Devices))



Interference mitigation - Test study

external
interference






- Test done with a Chirp jammer and the following GNSS receivers:
 - **Septentrio GNSS receiver (AsteRx4)**
 - RTK GPS+GLO
 - L1 stand-alone GPS+GLO
 - **Other High-Precision Receiver**
 - **Consumer grade L1 Receiver**





10 mW Commercial L1 Chirp Jammer

external
interference

AIM+




Spoofing




Cheap & Easy


- (mini-)PC + Software Defined Radio



- Open source software
 - *gps-sdr-sim*
- Even cheaper: USB3.0-to-VGA dongle
 - *osmo-f12k*



iPhone 6 under Attack



- Very Easily Spoofed
- Even with Pico Watts

General Anti-Spoofing Countermeasures



TIME/POSITION SHIFT

- Can be detected
- Alignment still possible with real time or position signals

ACCURATE CLOCKS

- HW design needs to consider high quality clocks

MULTI-FREQ MULTI-CONSTELLATION

- Backup signals
- Receivers need to be able to keep other signals alive


GNSS/INS

- Proper usage of IMUs

MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION

- GAL OSNMA
- GPS Chimera
- Signal readiness is important
- CPU will be important

What about different types of spoofers?



Regular Spoofing Attack Mitigation

- Look for anomalies in the signal



Missing Signals?
Inconsistent Signals?
Clock Anomalies?
Spectral Anomalies?
Navdata Issues?
...





Spoofing
Detected!



`SBF::RFStatus` → spoofing likely

Frequency Diversity in Action



Making it more difficult...

- Use high-end GNSS constellation generator



GNSS



Nice try!
But you're
spoofing...


All signals, including military, cleanly generated



SBF::RFStatus → spoofing likely

Making it even more difficult...


- Reradiate actual GNSS from other location or with small time delay



- Easy!
- Often used in production & maintenance halls
 - Testing GNSS Indoors

EM Field Property: Polarization



- Satellites Transmit **Right Hand Circular Polarized** Signals
 - RHCP
 - Field Rotates



How about Left Hand (LHCP)?


→ Just reverse shift

→ Signal already available in many antennas




Difference Between Spoofed and Authentic Satellites

- Spoofed Sats: Same Polarization
- Authentic Sats: Different Polarization




Septentrio's Polarization-Aware Receiver Prototype


- Permanent Monitoring of RHCP and LHCP
 - *Aided Tracking of LHCP to Capture Polarization at low C/No*



European
Global Navigation
Satellite Systems
Agency

A close-up photograph of a silver-colored metal padlock. The word "RELIABILITY" is engraved in bold, capital letters on the front of the padlock's body. The padlock has a braided steel shackle and a yellow combination lock mechanism. The background is a blurred blue sky with white clouds.

**Is not only about
Spoofing & Jamming**



Satellite or control segment malfunctions

Unintentional interference

- Radio-frequency interference (RFI) from external sources
- Testing at system level
- Ionospheric influence (solar maxima, magnetic storms, scintillations)
- Multipath

Intentional interference

- Jamming
- Spoofing (false signals into the receiver)
- Meaconing (interception and re-broadcast of navigation signals).

Receiver FW access

- Hacking into root access (admin)
- Upgrading receiver with different FW
- Loading extra permissions on receiver
- Access to FW for malicious actions (trojan horse)
- Access to uBoot

Receiver Interface

- Access to settings of receiver
- Access to data of receiver
- Access to monitoring of receiver
- Access to users & passwords stored in receiver
- Corrections

Application side

- Intercepting output
- Changing output over communication
- Pretending being someone else



Conclusion

- **Good GNSS tracking technology** allows proper resilience against jamming/spoofing (e.g. Septentrio AIM+)
- Creating a proper anti-spoofing or anti-jamming technique requires:
 - **proper HW/SW design**
- Latest spoofing detection on polarization is **capable to detect** very accurately generated spoofing signals (e.g. reradiators)

→ Awareness is critical in society



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